Ethics & Meta-Ethics

Table of Contents

Ethical Misapprehensions

Ditch Deuteronomy, Embrace Ecclesiastes

I. Preliminaries
The purpose of this guide (2200 words) is to provide, in mostly straightforward language, a basic understanding of ethics which is convincing; (it is intended to ring true). It also has the purpose of providing defences against commonplace fundamentalist approaches to ethics. Its starting point is that we are different, and therefore the responsibilities we assume for ourselves or attribute to others must also be various. No-one is responsible for everything, but everyone is responsible for something. On occasion, even, each of us may be bound, on pain of dereliction of duty, to hold another, or others, to account.

Many of the ethical problems that arise for reflective people..., — and you must be such a person if you are reading this, — ...many ethical problems come from confusion. We grow into the world learning various informal moral codes and ways of thinking about morality, and these are sometimes contradictory. Even as adults we find ourselves confounded, confounded indeed by both opinions and people — often opinionated people — that are fundamentalist in nature, but we are unsure how to react.

Talk about ethics is often used by superficial or manipulative people in order to exercise power, but failure to reflect on ethics can equally lead to well-meaning people causing harm and hurt, notably when they apply moral categories where they do not belong.

Sometimes, though, it may be right to hurt. Whereas many who speak or write about ethics like to emphasise principles and rules, or else talk about values, the approach taken below is to make distinctions while also noting the fluid — i.e. the ad-hoc — nature of many distinctions. Whereas others often focus on the rightness or wrongness of particular acts, without regard to who is performing those acts, here the focus is on the whole way of life of different people with their different - and changing - strengths and weaknesses.

Life should not be made out to be an ethical obstacle race. Nor, indeed, an endurance race.

Even many people who might be thought to be educated still fail to distinguish between the law of the land, the rules of everyday courtesy, and the domain of ethics or morality. An action may be wrong in law, but in given circumstances entirely justifiable. An act or an omission may be permitted by law, but be morally reprehensible. On occasion it is right to be discourteous.

I suggest, therefore, that the subject matter of ethics should be understood as the realm of conduct towards other people that is not adequately governed by law or by custom (i.e. the rules of etiquette, or of courtesy). this is not a precise or perfect definition, but it serves well enough as a correction to anyone failing to acknowledge the necessary distinctions between ethics, law and custom.

Some people like to distinguish between morality and ethics, and it would be a useful distinction to make if others had not meanwhile confused the two almost beyond redemption. the word Morality would denote customary behaviour considered in a given society to be appropriate & proper, whereas Ethics would refer to reflection on morality.

There is an awkward ambiguity about the word ethical in particular. It might describe the nature of a consideration or argument, as when either is ethical as opposed to being, say, legal or Machiavellian or insincere. But it is often used as a term of approval as, for instance, in the phrase ethical business.

II. The heart of the matter
Most of those who raise their voices in public discourse on matters of ethics and morality leave out of account one essential aspect, and that is the matter of motivation. In response to an appeal to behave ethically or morally, or more morally, or less unethically, one can always ask, though better in private than in public, why one should comply. In the case of the grand scheme of the law, it may be prudential to comply, seeing that otherwise one may be found out and punished. In the case of custom, when one oversteps the bounds of convention, others in one’s peer group are likely to impose their own punishment. But when the law has become so intricate that it has more loopholes than it holds out threats; when no-one — or no-one powerful — is looking to observe our indiscretions; then an explanation is needed as to why anyone should comply with an appeal to their supposedly better nature.

Sometimes an answer is given in terms of conscience; you will feel wretched or have nightmares. It should be noted that some people suffer these afflictions without ever having committed a felony or serious indiscretion.

Sometimes an answer is given in terms of divine intervention, or a severe demotion in a reincarnated life. Obviously, these replies only work for people with the relevant metaphysical convictions.

The short answer why we obey the law and why we behave ourselves most of the time is by force of habit. Of course, habits can be broken, and sometimes it is good to be rid of a habit.

None the less, the short answer takes us further than we might suppose, for we are in no small measure composed of our multitudinous habits such that without most of them we would be someone else. Habits persist even when they seem to have been jettisoned. thus there is honour among thieves, such that the ancient institution of the promise and an implicit sense of obligation of quid pro quo still count for something even there.

Look at how habits are composed. Slowly. Layer by layer, all through a childhood and beyond. they are so numerous and deeply embedded, one cannot even count them. It is possible to target and combat a handful of habits, but not all of them, nor even many all at once.

If, for example, you have acquired a habit of being generous, or brave, you might find yourself failing to be mean or quiescent when this is what circumstances command. You would have to practice, or remind yourself, rather than behaving unreflectively according to your second nature. You would have to learn how to spring over your shadow, and partly unlearn the self you have become.

there is, though, a more comprehensive explanation of what may motivate us to behave in a way that would seem to be disadvantageous while being, on another reckoning, the right thing to do. It has to do with one’s sense of self; of rightful pride: what sort of person am I? that is, with a sense of identity.

But to understand how this consideration can have real rather than merely rhetorical force, an appreciation of social dynamics is needed. this is what is left out of account by those who advocate obedience to a moral law without further elaboration of why it should be obeyed (or, indeed, of what its contents precisely are). Such advocates (and such they are: incipient lawyers)... such advocates imagine a kind of universal sameness where there is, in fact and blessedly, nearly endless variety.

Society is only necessary, and only functions, by virtue of our differences, and differences not only in terms of a variety of skills, but also because different roles and situations require varying moral strengths and indulgences.

Take it as axiomatic that no-one can possess all moral strengths and no weaknesses (nobody is wholly virtuous). thus even in the moral life, each person is assigned or else, best, seeks out a niche, a unique positioning. It is this positioning that is your personal guide on how to conduct yourself. In the intricacies of social interaction, others must behave differently. It is a psychological truth, and possibly a logical one, that the individual exercise of some moral strengths is inconsistent with the exercise of others by the selfsame person. At different times, different people must come to the fore. No-one is responsible for everything, but everyone is responsible for something.

However, some people — diverse kinds of freerider — dodge responsibility. they do this ingeniously and disingenuously. they pretend to contribute, or do so only when under observation. It is pointless appealing to their consciences or sense of common purpose. the way to deal with the manipulative is to confront them; stand in their way; make it clear that their calculation will not be tolerated. On occasion, an ethical stance involves a readiness to be unpleasant and to incur wrath. this is holding people to account, and it is an essential aspect of social dynamics. How often and when and exactly how, are separate issues.

Alongside the sense of identity that may result from assuming specific responsibilities, a further source of motivation may be found in an expanded sense of self. this happens most frequently when a person regards their closest kith and kin as extensions of themself, assuming or forging with these others a common purpose. Note that here our commonplace notions of egoism and altruism are upset. It could, paradoxically, be said that individuals who are commonly regarded as egoistic are, in fact, people with very small egos, because their sense of self barely extends beyond their own present confines, whereas greater souls encompass something of their fellow men.

III. No absolute answers
These responses to the question of motivation are not definitive. There is more to be said, and more is said elsewhere on this and related websites. It is possible to query any response; that is, it is possible to imagine scenarios where any intuitions we have about what drives us, about right & wrong, or about good, bad & evil, are unsettled or upset. Contemporary moral philosophers have been skilled at provoking such discomfort. This may be appropriate if those addressed are embarking on an education in moral philosophy. But it is counter-productive if the need is to provide a rough-&-ready framework so that reasonably intelligent and sensitive people can see their way clear and be given some defence against bogus claims on their consciences. ...Because much of the mischief in speech about ethics comes about when a rogue saying (precept, maxim) is introduced into the dispute. Suddenly an idea from a different moral code — the joker in the pack — is presented as self-evident, valid and relevant. This is where someone who is seriously educated in moral philosophy can help to counter the mischief.

Whereas in academic circles there is a tendency to obscure matters, by, for example, manufacturing new and ever more complicated meta-languages, or by referring to age-old positions by the name of the advocate or upstart who is fashionable (but the fashions are provincial and changeable)....whereas, in order maybe to protect their status as experts, some intellectuals pursue obscurantism and irrelevance, the main contemporary threat to ethics comes surely from fundamentalism.

Beware of those who present ethics in terms of a moral law, as if mandated by a godlike legislator. Beware, too, of those who present values as if these were absolutes, like guardian angels or saints, rather than stars that we might, at night on the high sea, consult in order to navigate through troubled waters to a haven.

Beware of grand words. Few of those who use them are able to spell out what they involve or to counter criticism. We do sometimes, though rarely, need large abstractions, but they need careful handling. For example, the omnipresent talk of values is largely meaningless, whereas talk of priorities, and the need sometimes to juggle priorities, would make a little sense at least. For example: Freedom is not itself a value; it is a precondition of value. Only by exercising choice do we bestow value in one place rather than another.

Beware of golden rules and categorical imperatives. These cover either too much or too little, and again fail to take account of the dynamics of social interaction. Adherents of these are easy game for manipulative types. Many vocal people are eager to claim respect and have their rights upheld, but are remarkably reluctant to accord respect that goes beyond lipservice, and similarly reticent when it is their turn to assume responsibilities. Real respect would mean holding people — including such people — to account, and possibly doing so in no uncertain terms.

Beware, finally, of a confusion that is both innocent and common. In discourse about ethics, one word that gives rise to much contention is Relativism. Everything is relative, say some, while others insist on absolute values. This is too intricate a matter for a brief treatment here. Suffice it to say that there is a world of difference between the refusal to agree to a generalisation and a refusal to pass judgement in a particular case where one is duly informed about the details of the matter. the insistence on absolutes masks the fact that generalisations are contentious once the detail is addressed. Some people — bless them! — are wary of grand statements, but are perfectly willing and able to form a considered opinion in a particular case. You do not have to be a grammarian, indeed you do not need to have studied linguistics, in order to know how to form or recognise perfectly grammatical sentences. Similarly, unusual and complex cases aside, you do not need to be articulate about ethics in order to utter judgment where judgment is due. But neither should you roam the virtual countryside to seek out targets for your judgment.
> PDF, large font for ease of reading on mobile devices, or else choose the html text below.

2. On when to tell the truth, and when not

3. Teaching ethics and Character


4. Principles, Exceptions and Judgement: The uses and abuses of moral rules

---

---

...............................................................................

On when to tell the truth, and when not

900 words, 2007

Truth-telling and its pendant, lying, provide a telling way to illustrate the vagaries of ethics and rules. The default position is that the truth is told for the sake of the coherence of language and community. Not a few thinkers (including Kant) have held that one should always tell the truth, no matter what; or at least that lying should be reserved for only very extreme cases. Most people have recourse to the device of the white lie: whereas one should always tell the truth, a white lie is not only allowed, but imperative (to avoid an insult, a betrayal, or misleading with a subtlety the listener is ill-equipped to comprehend). But when is a potential lie indeed white? The habitual or occasional liar will be adept at the art of whitewash.

One might, for illustrative purposes, develop a list of examples, perhaps broken down by category, of seriously white lies. I propose a different approach. Focussing on the literal truthfulness or falsity of what is said directs our attention fatally away from the wider context, most importantly, from the recipient of the truth or the falsehood. (Advocates of resolute truth-telling, by contrast, like to focus not on the recipient, but on the integrity of the speaker, and any supposed harm to the speaker's character or reputation.) The issue, I submit, is what claim a person may have to receive a truth. A distinction may be drawn between whether they are being presented with an unsolicited untruth or whether they have posed (explicitly or implicitly) a question in expectation of a truthful answer.

The default position must be that a person should not be led astray by novel disinformation. The situation is already quite different when someone demands to know something. In the world of diplomacy and public relations, one response to an indiscreet question is of the sort "We never comment on this sort of matter." More commonly, the responses to an indiscreet question are a lie, a half-truth, an evasion or a redescription of the matter being enquired about. "Three questions, and give me a straight answer, if you will. Have you finally stopped masturbating? Is it true that your bank is in financial difficulties? And what do you really think of me anyway?" (The best weapon in polemics remains satire.)

I propose two principles for judging whether or the extent to which the truth should be told in a given situation.

1. Does the recipient of the truth or the untruth have a claim to be truthfully informed?

2. What respect does the speaker owe the specific person or group being addressed?

Note that you may be so respectful of another as to withhold the truth (the classic white lie: Auntie does not deserve to be told that, no, you didn't appreciate the cakes she baked); or you may justly have too little respect (e.g. when a criminal tries to trick or coerce you into providing information).

The issue in (1) of the claim or right of someone to be truthfully informed is a function of the relationship. Perhaps a spouse does have an entitlement to know about your possible masturbation. The finance minister may have a duty to enquire – and a right to be informed of the truth – regarding your bank's financial health, but not an ordinary investor or a journalist.

In the case of the third mock question, "What do you really think of me anyway?" merely asking let alone answering it is likely to alter fundamentally the nature of the relationship. This last scenario points to another aspect of the matter in hand, namely the subjective nature of much that is enquired about or proffered in relation to truth-telling. A person who is not much given to introspection or self-doubt will have less difficulty with speaking sincerely than a scrupulously honest introvert. It is also a matter of social practice. The person who qualifies – or is hesitant about – their response to an indiscreet question is likely to find their account discounted or discredited ("if he already admits this weakness, then the truth will be much worse") whereas another kind of character is so adept at self-deception, or has so little depth, that they will hardly register how blatantly false their reply is.

My advice here is to err on the side of simplification. Anyone who has read this far is likely already to take these matters much more thoughtfully and seriously than those they have dealings with. To arrive at substantial truth, a lengthy process of acquaintance and attention to detail is needed, and those unwilling to be so patient are also unworthy of knowing the exact circumstances of the matter in question. There is also the issue of collateral casualties. I may have to lie to one person who is undeserving of the lie in order to avoid revealing what must remain concealed from others. And remember this: In life it is futile to move too far from common practice. You can only be as truthful (or good) as the environment allows. You may try to change the environment, but that will require subtlety. Or you can move to another environment where you are more at ease or better accepted.

Teaching Ethics and Character

One approach to teaching ethics is to ask an individual what problems they see as ethical, and take the reasoning from there. Or one can coax a group to steer towards some (purported) ethical insight. One drawback with initiating a group discussion is that the possibly essential concerns of some individuals will be swept aside as the discussion goes off at a tangent. In ethics, it is easy & amateurish (= child’s play) to confuse individuals, or let a group get itself tied up in knots.

The classical philosophical approach, which goes back to Plato, is an educational and a critical one. The teacher is an interrogator. There is much virtue in this approach, but to be effective it requires a lot of time, which is to say countless sessions over the course possibly of years. It is arguably the correct approach to training moral philosophers. But it is wholly inappropriate for the instruction of people whose philosophical leaning is slight, and whose intellectual lives are in any case overloaded.

Hence, somewhat in defiance of the conventions of philosophy, I wish here to present my own findings: that is to say, a model for understanding and tackling ethical issues in a wider context. It will be necessary to cover all the major issues, and show how they are interrelated. My starting point is also the thread running through all my reflections. It is that the virtue of pursuing the study of ethics lies in coming to recognise when ethical reflection, or morality, is inappropriate, i.e. when concern about ethically right or wrong action may itself be the cause of vexation, misunderstandings, harm and hurt.

The two most insistent questions in ethics are why be moral? and what is right and wrong? Another issue is the nature of moral relativity. Others are the usefulness or otherwise of the concept of evil, the nature of the virtues and vices, and the relationship of individual morality to the well-being of the wider community.

Instead of pursuing directly the sceptical question of Why should I be moral? we might ask how we choose to bring up our children, and why. If being moral involves all sorts of costs, such as the burden of a bad conscience in the case of wrongdoing, and of palpable harm to the actor that may arise from choosing the right course of action, then we might deem it best, in the interests of the child which, we suppose, we have at heart, to bring the child up to be an opportunist. Of course, the consequences of this might run counter to our own interests, but not necessarily. So let us put aside this objection, and consider whether it would be possible and perhaps desirable to instruct the child in opportunism, in preference to ethics. It might be practically difficult in the case of a young child, since young children are, when attentive, notoriously rigid in their adherence to rules. Another difficulty is that opportunism is a matter of degree. The child, soon to become a young adult, will need to develop some modest virtues: for example, be able to be hard-working on occasion, display a modicum of courage rather than cowardice, know how to be supportive of others at least some of the time, and so on. Perhaps some virtues can be neglected, if circumstances are so favourable that they need not be exercised. Thrift, for example, will not be as much in demand in an affluent setting as generosity, although here, too, a sense of balance is never amiss.

But, these qualifications accepted, would we want to bring the child up to be free of moral qualms? Would it even be upbringing in such a case, rather than just letting the child run riot? And would it be to the child(s later advantage to be free of moral qualms?

We do not know the circumstances and the trials that, later, the child will encounter as an adult. We seek to develop such virtues as the child has aptitude for, and check those weaknesses which might well prove fatal, on the assumption (if we ever reflect on this) that life will in the fullness of time reward those virtues. That is, we act on a presumption, a generalisation.

Now later circumstances need not match our expectations. Courage may become costly, openness make for vulnerability, truthfulness may be persecuted, generosity exploited, and so on. This is in part a problem with the virtues. In adverse circumstances, any virtue can become a vice. Courage becomes foolhardiness, truthfulness needs to be moderated with sensitivity, and so on. The key capability here is a sense of judgement, and it is good judgement perhaps above all else that marks out the mature from the immature. (Although the opportunist too, when successful, is a master of judgement.)

But the manner in which circumstances may vitiate our virtues might have nothing to do with avoiding excess. Courage means taking risks, and the cautiously courageous person may still fall foul of the peril. But then it is too late. You do not spring over your own shadow. You are what you are. That is what character is about.

So, to return to the question Why be moral? the answer in general terms is one of constitution. You act as you do because of the sort of person you are.

Now, with time, you might make yourself into another person, a better or a worse or simply a different person. And in given circumstances you might reflect and decide not to act in character. That might be the right decision (though this begs the question of right and wrong). The brave may have a bad day, and behave cowardly. Or the brave may desert courage for other, more timely virtues.

As is in the nature of habits, the disposition of courage (and of attentiveness, magnanimity, prudence, sobriety, etc.) allows of exceptions. A habit is what you usually do, not necessarily what you always do. It is what you do when there is no great temptation, or reason, to depart from the habit. But departures are conceivable and sometimes desirable. It is on the occasion of such a departure that, depending on the nature of the case, reflections of an ethical nature may come into play.

Put in more general terms, we see that ethical reflection and ethical dilemmas takes place against a background of ordinary behaviour. This ordinary behaviour might itself be called in question, which represents the attempt to resolve the dilemmas at a more fundamental level.

One of the purposes of what is said below is to convey an understanding of ethics that enables readers to develop in their own direction rather than acting as an unwelcome constraint (as happens with much moralising). And, for this, it is important to reflect before choosing the starting point.

This starting point must not be, as traditional academics (and the Deep Christian State) would have it, with grand talk of the Good Life (rather than a good life), the nature of the Good and the like, but by insisting that the greater part of the harm & hurt in the world may be caused not by outright wickedness or selfishness, but by misplaced morality.

One starting point for ethics is the personal question of where an individual fits in or, indeed, when an individual should choose not to fit in. The emphasis here is on the person within a social context, and the fact that the part to be played must be different for each one of us. It may be the case that certain recurrent scenarios need to be handled similarly by all or most people, but — although one concern — it is not quite the core concern of ethics, since it belongs rather to the domains of law or of custom. Ethics can only persuade universally by addressing the disparate constellations faced individually.

Another starting point, similar but broader, is that ethics is about the distribution of responsibilities. This cuts different ways. At one level it is about the various responsibilities one individual — as distinct from some others — has or should assume. At another level, though, it is about holding others to account, that is, assigning praise or blame.

By choosing this kind of focus as the starting point of ethics, we avoid from the outset many easy and misleading generalisations about desirable and undesirable conduct; that is, we avoid what theologians call(ed) Casuistry, which is the legalistic analysis of the rightness or wrongness of individual actions (independent, as it were, of who is committing them or their wider context). The incident-based approach is often unhelpful or counter-productive because it makes of the moral life and indeed life overall too much of a hurdle race. At any juncture the earnest individual is called upon to survey the scene for possible pitfalls: it is the moralising intellect that is canvassed rather than intuition and experience (or indeed tradition).
Casuistry instead of character.
The fashionable incarnation of Casuistry is Compliance.

There is a proper role for the act-based approach, but not in the heartland of ethics. Its place is the border territory between the law of the land (or else institutional code of conduct) which should reflect well-anchored custom and, in stark contrast, the realm of necessary individual freedom of discretion.

Principles, Exceptions and Judgement

Regularly the call goes out for a return to principles and obedience to moral rules. But such appeals miss the point in more than one way.
Briefly:

1. There is no one principle that will do the job, and, as soon as there are two or three principles and ten or twenty moral rules, problems arise as to their hierarchy and proper spheres. Separate rules are needed on how to interpret whichever worthy principle is being advocated, and ranking rules in order to know how to handle conflicts between different moral principles or rules. Formulating or even just counting the rules rapidly becomes too technical and cumbersome to be able to offer people in the turmoil of life any serious guidance. (And ethics cannot be the preserve of ethicists and logicians.)

2. There is interminable disagreement about what principles or rules to adopt.

3. Individuals need to know why they should keep to any principles or rules and whether if at all they can make exceptions.

4. If generally we all kept to the same principles and rules, human culture as we know it would disappear. We would live parallel, identical lives, since there would be no room for individuality.
> Download the discussion paper as PDF.

 

---

---